TACTIC: EXFILTRATION

Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002): Real Cases

MITRE Definition ↗
Adversaries transfer exfiltrated victim archives directly to external commercial cloud object storage or synchronization providers such as MEGA or Rclone.

Key Facts

Technique ID
T1567.002
Exfiltration
Mapped Cases
8
Primary sources
Related Laws
0
Criminal statutes
  • ATT&CK Technique Identifier: T1567.002.
  • Tactical Phase: Exfiltration.
  • Substantiated in 8 primary court prosecution and advisory cases.
  • Linked records cite judicial dockets, plea agreements, or federal advisories.

Verified Evidentiary Case Records (8)

Mass cyber extortion campaign exploiting a zero-day SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362) in Progress Software MOVEit Transfer appliances, exfiltrating personal records of over 90 million individuals across 2,700 organizations without encrypting files.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: CISA Advisory AA23-158A
"Extracted archives were compressed into multipart ZIP files and exfiltrated to adversary-controlled cloud servers prior to publishing extortion notices on Tor leak sites."
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts · CISA Advisory AA23-158A View full case dossier →

Adversaries compromised a senior DevOps engineer home computer by exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Plex Media Server, implanted keyloggers to capture master vault credentials, and exfiltrated encrypted customer password vaults from AWS S3 storage.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: CISA Advisory on Cloud Storage Credential Theft
"Using captured AWS access keys and decryption tokens, the actors directly queried AWS S3 buckets to exfiltrate database backups containing customer vault blobs."
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts · Incident Retrospective 2022-2023 View full case dossier →

LockBit ransomware affiliates exploited the Citrix Bleed zero-day (CVE-2023-4966) to bypass multi-factor authentication, exfiltrating 43 gigabytes of sensitive internal aerospace data and parts distribution documentation from Boeing parts and distribution business.

Kill-Chain Phase: Exfiltration (Cloud Storage Exfiltration via Rclone)

Using command-line cloud transfer tools (Rclone), the attackers exfiltrated the 43 GB data repository to external cloud storage providers.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · SEC Form 8-K Disclosure View full case dossier →

Parallel federal indictments in New Jersey and Washington, D.C. charging Russian national Mikhail Pavlovich Matveev, known online as Wazawaka, with participating in three major ransomware conspiracies (Babuk, LockBit, and Hive). Prosecutors allege Matveev deployed Babuk against the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia in April 2021 and attacked law enforcement, healthcare, and municipal entities worldwide.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: D.N.J. Indictment 2:23-cr-00383
"Prior to encryption, operators exfiltrated sensitive investigative files and personnel records and threatened public release on darknet leak portals."
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey & District of Columbia · 2:23-cr-00383 / 1:23-cr-00161 View full case dossier →

Landmark U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement order against financial communications provider R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (RRD) arising from a November-December 2021 ransomware attack. The SEC found that RRD failed to maintain adequate disclosure controls and internal accounting controls after missing multiple internal intrusion alerts prior to encryption and exfiltration of 70 gigabytes of data.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: SEC Order Release No. 34-100365, Para. 15
"Intruders exfiltrated approximately 70 gigabytes of corporate and client financial records before RRD isolated affected systems."
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · 3-21969 View full case dossier →

Coordinated international law enforcement disruption led by the FBI and UK NCA seizing three U.S. servers, three UK servers, 18 German servers, and eight domains operated by the Radar/Dispossessor ransomware group. Dispossessor targeted at least 43 small and medium-sized businesses across healthcare, education, and financial services by recycling data stolen by LockBit.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: E.D. Ark. Seizure Warrant Affidavit 1:24-mj-01189
"Threat actors exfiltrated victim files and pressured victims through email and telephone threats if ransom demands were not paid."
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas · 1:24-mj-01189 View full case dossier →

Eastern District of Virginia indictment and international domain seizure targeting RaidForums founder Diogo Santos Coelho, known online as Omnipotent. RaidForums operated from 2015 to 2022 as a major English-language clearinghouse where cybercriminals bought, sold, and leaked stolen databases containing more than 10 billion unique victim records.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: E.D. Va. Indictment 1:22-cr-00018
"Threat actors used RaidForums escrow and credit systems to monetize and distribute exfiltrated corporate SQL dumps and customer databases."
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · 1:22-cr-00018 View full case dossier →

Eastern District of Virginia prosecution of Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, known online as pompompurin, who created and administered BreachForums as the successor to RaidForums. BreachForums hosted over 14 billion stolen records from 888+ breached organizations, and Fitzpatrick personally exploited and leaked data from the FBI's InfraGard portal.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: E.D. Va. Information 1:23-cr-00119
"Operated BreachForums as an extortion and data-brokerage platform hosting exfiltrated corporate datasets for sale or credit redemption."
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · 1:23-cr-00119 View full case dossier →