TACTIC: INITIAL ACCESS

Spearphishing Voice (T1566.004): Real Cases

MITRE Definition ↗
Adversaries impersonate employees or executives over telephone calls with IT help desks to trick support agents into resetting passwords and MFA tokens.

Key Facts

Technique ID
T1566.004
Initial Access
Mapped Cases
4
Primary sources
Related Laws
1
Criminal statutes
  • ATT&CK Technique Identifier: T1566.004.
  • Tactical Phase: Initial Access.
  • Substantiated in 4 primary court prosecution and advisory cases.
  • Linked records cite judicial dockets, plea agreements, or federal advisories.

Verified Evidentiary Case Records (4)

Sophisticated social engineering and ransomware attack carried out by cybercrime collective Scattered Spider partnering with ALPHV/BlackCat, utilizing a 10-minute phone call to the Okta IT helpdesk to bypass MFA, hijack administrative privileges, and paralyze hotel reservations, digital keys, and casino slot machines.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: CISA & FBI Joint Advisory AA23-320A
"Operatives conducted targeted voice phishing (vishing) calls to the internal IT helpdesk, impersonating an MGM employee identified on LinkedIn to successfully request a password reset and MFA credential registration."
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada · 2:23-cv-01584 View full case dossier →

17-year-old hacker orchestrated a spearphishing and social engineering scheme targeting Twitter employees, gaining access to internal administrative customer service tools and hijacking 130 high-profile verified accounts (including Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Elon Musk, and Apple) to promote a fraudulent Bitcoin giveaway.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Criminal Information ¶ 4, Page 2
"Clark called Twitter employees on their cellular phones claiming to be from the internal IT department, directing them to enter VPN credentials on a convincing phishing website."
Hillsborough County 13th Judicial Circuit Court · 20-CF-008922 View full case dossier →

Sophisticated vishing and social engineering intrusion by the Scattered Spider syndicate targeting an outsourced IT helpdesk servicing Caesars Entertainment, culminating in loyalty database exfiltration and approximately $15 million in cryptocurrency extortion paid to avert public release, disclosed in SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: CISA Advisory AA23-320A: Scattered Spider
"Operatives placed voice calls (vishing) to an outsourced vendor IT helpdesk, posing as employee personnel to reset multi-factor authentication credentials."
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR · SEC-8K-0000858339-23-000043 View full case dossier →

Southern District of New York prosecution of British citizen Joseph James O'Connor, known online as PlugWalkJoe, for orchestrating high-profile SIM-swapping cryptocurrency thefts and participating in the July 2020 Twitter VIP account compromise alongside Graham Ivan Clark. Extradited from Spain, O'Connor pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in federal prison.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: S.D.N.Y. Plea Allocution (May 9, 2023)
"O'Connor and co-conspirators used social engineering and voice phishing against mobile carrier employees to execute unauthorized SIM swaps."
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York · 1:21-cr-00468 View full case dossier →

Commonly Charged Criminal Statutes