TACTIC: COLLECTION

Data from Cloud Storage (T1530): Real Cases

MITRE Definition ↗
Adversaries enumerate and exfiltrate sensitive backups, customer logs, and secrets from cloud object storage buckets or SaaS repositories.

Key Facts

Technique ID
T1530
Collection
Mapped Cases
9
Primary sources
Related Laws
0
Criminal statutes
  • ATT&CK Technique Identifier: T1530.
  • Tactical Phase: Collection.
  • Substantiated in 9 primary court prosecution and advisory cases.
  • Linked records cite judicial dockets, plea agreements, or federal advisories.

Verified Evidentiary Case Records (9)

Illegal exfiltration of call and text interaction metadata spanning six months for approximately 110 million AT&T wireless customers. Intrusion stemmed from an illicit access point to a third-party Snowflake cloud environment, leading to a 5.7 Bitcoin extortion fee paid through an intermediary to obtain verified video evidence of dataset deletion.

Kill-Chain Phase: Mass Query & Harvesting (Call Detail Record (CDR) Data Extraction)

Attackers executed automated queries to pull massive tables containing Call Detail Records (CDRs), phone numbers, interaction counts, and cell tower IDs.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission & DOJ National Security Division · SEC-2024-8K-ATT View full case dossier →

Chinese state-affiliated threat actors conducted spearphishing campaigns against Anthem health insurance subsidiaries, deploying customized backdoors to penetrate enterprise data warehouses and exfiltrate 78.8 million personal health and identity records.

Kill-Chain Phase: Data Collection (Structured SQL Query Exfiltration)

Threat actors queried the unencrypted Oracle enterprise data warehouse containing tens of millions of health plan subscriber records.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana · 1:19-cr-00149 View full case dossier →

Teenage cyber extortion collective LAPSUS$ compromised a third-party customer support contractor (Sitel) workstation via an active RDP session, gaining access to Okta SuperUser administrative diagnostic tools affecting 366 enterprise tenants.

Kill-Chain Phase: Target Querying (Customer Tenant Investigation)

Attackers searched for high-profile corporate accounts, attempting to view multi-factor reset logs and customer tenant identities.

Southwark Crown Court (UK) · City of London Police / FBI Joint Action View full case dossier →

Adversaries compromised a senior DevOps engineer home computer by exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Plex Media Server, implanted keyloggers to capture master vault credentials, and exfiltrated encrypted customer password vaults from AWS S3 storage.

Kill-Chain Phase: Cloud Access (Access to AWS Production Backup Storage)

Armed with master credentials and AWS access keys from the engineer home workstation, attackers accessed cloud storage (AWS S3) buckets.

U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts · Incident Retrospective 2022-2023 View full case dossier →

Historic federal criminal prosecution of former Uber Chief Security Officer Joseph Sullivan for obstruction of justice and misprision of a felony after concealing a massive breach of 57 million user and driver records by paying $100,000 in Bitcoin through a bug bounty program under non-disclosure agreements.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: DOJ Criminal Indictment ¶ 16, Page 7
"Threat actors accessed Uber private Amazon S3 cloud storage buckets housing unencrypted databases containing 57 million customer records and 600,000 driver license numbers."
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · 3:20-cr-00337-WHO View full case dossier →

Material cybersecurity breach of Fortune 100 life insurer Prudential Financial, wherein ALPHV/BlackCat threat actors breached corporate administrative workstations and accessed cloud tenant data, filed under the four-day SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 reporting mandate.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Prudential SEC Form 8-K Amendment
"Attackers exfiltrated limited administrative files and employee directory metadata from corporate cloud storage before containment."
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR · SEC-8K-0001137774-24-000012 View full case dossier →

Eastern District of Virginia indictment and international domain seizure targeting RaidForums founder Diogo Santos Coelho, known online as Omnipotent. RaidForums operated from 2015 to 2022 as a major English-language clearinghouse where cybercriminals bought, sold, and leaked stolen databases containing more than 10 billion unique victim records.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: E.D. Va. Seizure Affidavit
"Leaked datasets hosted and indexed on the forum originated from misconfigured cloud buckets and compromised enterprise databases."
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · 1:22-cr-00018 View full case dossier →

Eastern District of Virginia prosecution of Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, known online as pompompurin, who created and administered BreachForums as the successor to RaidForums. BreachForums hosted over 14 billion stolen records from 888+ breached organizations, and Fitzpatrick personally exploited and leaked data from the FBI's InfraGard portal.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: E.D. Va. Criminal Complaint & Plea Statement of Facts
"Fitzpatrick obtained and published stolen databases containing sensitive PII, SSNs, and corporate records from cloud storage and enterprise repositories."
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · 1:23-cr-00119 View full case dossier →

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement order against London-based educational publisher Pearson plc for misleading investors about a 2018 cyber intrusion affecting its AIMSweb 1.0 platform. Despite knowing that attackers exploited an unpatched server vulnerability to steal 13,000+ school and university accounts containing millions of student rows, Pearson described the risk as hypothetical in its 2019 SEC filings.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: SEC Order Release No. 33-10963, Para. 13
"Intruders accessed and downloaded databases containing 13,000+ school customer accounts and millions of student dates of birth and email addresses."
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · 3-20462 View full case dossier →