TACTIC: CREDENTIAL ACCESS

OS Credential Dumping (T1003): Real Cases

MITRE Definition ↗
Adversaries dump plaintext passwords and hashes from operating system memory structures such as LSASS.

Key Facts

Technique ID
T1003
Credential Access
Mapped Cases
10
Primary sources
Related Laws
7
Criminal statutes
  • ATT&CK Technique Identifier: T1003.
  • Tactical Phase: Credential Access.
  • Substantiated in 10 primary court prosecution and advisory cases.
  • Linked records cite judicial dockets, plea agreements, or federal advisories.

Verified Evidentiary Case Records (10)

Six Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) military officers charged with deploying the NotPetya wiper, Olympic Destroyer malware, KillDisk attacks against Ukrainian power grids, and cyberattacks targeting French elections.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Indictment ¶ 46, Page 23
"The malware harvested passwords from computer memory using a bundled Mimikatz variant to impersonate network administrators."
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · 2:20-cr-00316 View full case dossier →

State-sponsored cyber group sponsored by the People's Republic of China breached dozens of U.S. critical infrastructure operators in communications, energy, transportation, and water systems to establish disruptive persistent access.

Kill-Chain Phase: Discovery & Active Directory Theft (NTDS.dit Shadow Copy Extraction)

Operators created volume shadow copies on domain controllers to extract the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and SYSTEM registry hives, enabling offline password cracking.

Federal Law Enforcement Action / FISA Court Authorized Operations · CISA-AA24-038A View full case dossier →

Conspiracy between Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers and criminal hackers to breach Yahoo's network, compromising 500 million user accounts to conduct espionage against journalists, government officials, and commercial executives.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Indictment ¶ 27, Page 15
"Adversaries stole Yahoo's proprietary user database containing names, email addresses, cryptographic salts, and hashed passwords."
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · 3:17-cr-00103 View full case dossier →

Key software developers and coders of the transnational Trickbot cybercrime group charged with infecting millions of victim computers with banking trojans and facilitating Conti/Ryuk ransomware deployments against hospitals.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Indictment ¶ 19, Page 11
"Injected modular credential harvesters that pulled domain credentials from Windows memory to pave the way for ransomware."
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 1:20-cr-00384 View full case dossier →

North Korean state-sponsored operators infiltrated Sony Pictures Entertainment, deploying destructive Shamoon/Destover wipers that permanently erased thousands of servers and workstations, exfiltrating terabytes of unreleased films, employee SSNs, and executive emails.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: FBI Flash Alert: Destructive Malware
"Operators deployed custom credential dumpers to extract Active Directory hashes and plaintext administrative passwords from compromised system memory."
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · 2:18-cr-00569 View full case dossier →

Chinese state-affiliated threat actors conducted spearphishing campaigns against Anthem health insurance subsidiaries, deploying customized backdoors to penetrate enterprise data warehouses and exfiltrate 78.8 million personal health and identity records.

Kill-Chain Phase: Credential Dumping (High-Privilege Credential Dumping)

Adversaries used memory scraping tools to capture credentials of database administrators with access to the enterprise data warehouse.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana · 1:19-cr-00149 View full case dossier →

State-sponsored cyber espionage operators maintained undetected access to the Starwood guest reservation database for four years, deploying remote access trojans and memory scrapers to exfiltrate unencrypted passport numbers, payment cards, and travel itineraries.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: UK Information Commissioner's Office Penalty Notice
"Attackers utilized memory-scraping tools and credential harvesting scripts to pull plaintext payment card details before encryption at rest occurred."
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · FTC Docket No. C-4712 View full case dossier →

Sophisticated memory-scraping malware intrusion into point-of-sale systems across 77 Neiman Marcus luxury department stores, capturing payment card Track 2 data in memory over a four-month stealth campaign, resolved through a multi-state Attorney General consent decree.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Multi-State AG Settlement Agreement ¶ 8
"Custom RAM scraper malware monitored process memory of payment gateway applications, copying unencrypted magnetic stripe Track 2 data before encryption."
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois · 2019-CH-00438 View full case dossier →

Historic retail network compromise wherein cybercriminals used stolen third-party HVAC vendor credentials to penetrate Home Depot corporate intranet, deploying custom BlackPOS memory-scraping malware across 2,200 store checkout terminals and exfiltrating 56 million credit and debit card records.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶ 54, Page 23
"Custom variant of BlackPOS malware was staged on self-checkout terminals, periodically scraping unencrypted payment card magnetic stripe Track 1 and Track 2 records from memory."
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · 1:14-md-02583-TWT View full case dossier →

Congressional investigation and federal incident response record detailing the 2014-2015 cyber intrusion into the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Threat actors compromised contractor credentials, maintained months of covert persistence using Sakula and PlugX-family malware, and exfiltrated SF-86 background investigation records for 21.5 million individuals along with 5.6 million fingerprint records.

Primary Source Evidence Excerpt: House Oversight Majority Staff Report, Findings
"Once inside OPM's environment, intruders harvested Windows domain administrator credentials and pivoted to legacy mainframe databases."
U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform · House Oversight Report 114-2 View full case dossier →

Commonly Charged Criminal Statutes