MITRE ATT&CK G0034
Aliases: Telebots, Voodoo Bear, Iron Viking, Unit 74455, BlackEnergy Group
Official Attribution Source: U.S. Department of Justice Indictment (W.D. Pa.) & CISA

Key Facts

Jurisdiction
Russian Federation
Geographic origin
Cases
2
Prosecution matters
Defendants
5
Indicted individuals
Sanctions
0
OFAC designations
  • Attributed Country: Russian Federation.
  • ATT&CK Group Reference: G0034 (Sandworm Team).
  • Linked to 2 primary court prosecution record(s) with $10.1 billion documented loss.
  • Identified 5 individually charged operative(s) and 0 OFAC designation(s).

Primary ATT&CK Techniques Employed

ATT&CK Techniques Mapped to Sandworm Team Technique frequencies extracted from verified indictments for Sandworm Team. T1485 Data Destruction 1 incidents T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application 1 incidents T1021.002 SMB / Windows Admin Shares 1 incidents T1003 OS Credential Dumping 1 incidents T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment 1 incidents T1055.012 Process Hollowing 1 incidents T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location 1 incidents T1543.003 Windows Service 1 incidents
Technique frequencies extracted from verified indictments for Sandworm Team.
ATT&CK Techniques Mapped to Sandworm Team
Technique Frequency
T1485 Data Destruction 1 incidents
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application 1 incidents
T1021.002 SMB / Windows Admin Shares 1 incidents
T1003 OS Credential Dumping 1 incidents
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment 1 incidents
T1055.012 Process Hollowing 1 incidents
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location 1 incidents
T1543.003 Windows Service 1 incidents

Prosecution Cases Attributed to Sandworm Team

Six Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) military officers charged with deploying the NotPetya wiper, Olympic Destroyer malware, KillDisk attacks against Ukrainian power grids, and cyberattacks targeting French elections.

Primary Attack Mechanism: Supply-chain compromise of Ukrainian tax accounting software M.E.Doc (Intellect Service). Threat actors infiltrated the vendor's update infrastructure and backdoored the routine update binary ezvit.exe to deploy a malicious loader across thousands of corporate networks.
10 techniques mapped · Loss: $10.0 billion View full case dossier →

Federal criminal indictment charging Russian military intelligence conspirator serving GRU Unit 29155 with unleashing the destructive WhisperGate master boot record wiper malware against Ukrainian civilian ministry systems on the eve of the 2022 invasion and conducting cyber reconnaissance against 26 NATO member state critical infrastructure networks.

Primary Attack Mechanism: Adversary gained initial access via Exploit Public-Facing Application: Conspirators exploited vulnerabilities in content management systems and public-facing web servers to establish foothold before wiper detonation.
2 techniques mapped · Loss: $50.0 million View full case dossier →

Indicted Operatives & Dispositions (5)

GRU Unit 74455 military officer who developed components of the NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer malware.

Sentence: Pending / None

GRU Unit 74455 officer who conducted spearphishing campaigns targeting the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games.

Sentence: Pending / None

GRU Unit 74455 malware engineer who developed KillDisk wiper payloads.

Sentence: Pending / None

GRU Unit 74455 officer responsible for reconnaissance and technical exploitation of French political parties.

Sentence: Pending / None

GRU Unit 74455 military officer who assisted in the deployment of Olympic Destroyer malware.

Sentence: Pending / None

Documented TTP Signature for Sandworm Team

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