{
  "id": "case-us-v-zhu-hua-zhang-shilong-apt10",
  "slug": "us-v-zhu-hua-zhang-shilong-apt10",
  "title": "U.S. v. Zhu Hua & Zhang Shilong (APT10 Cloud Hopper MSP Espionage)",
  "summary": "Landmark Southern District of New York indictment charging Chinese Ministry of State Security-linked hackers Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong, members of APT10, with conducting a global cyber espionage campaign known as Operation Cloud Hopper. From 2006 to 2018, the defendants compromised major Managed Service Providers (MSPs) to pivot into the networks of more than 45 U.S. technology and defense firms, NASA JPL, and the U.S. Navy.",
  "case_number": "1:18-cr-00891",
  "court": "U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York",
  "district": "S.D.N.Y.",
  "country": "United States",
  "opened_at": "2018-12-20",
  "status": "fugitive",
  "victim_sector": "Managed Service Providers & Defense",
  "victim_country": "United States",
  "loss_amount_usd": null,
  "loss_amount_note": "Exfiltrated hundreds of gigabytes of proprietary intellectual property, defense schematics, and U.S. Navy personnel records across 12 countries.",
  "first_seen_at": "2014-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "last_updated_at": "2026-10-18T10:00:00Z",
  "actor_slug": null,
  "defendant_slugs": [
    "zhu-hua",
    "zhang-shilong"
  ],
  "cves": [],
  "techniques": [
    {
      "technique_id": "T1566.001",
      "evidence_excerpt": "APT10 operatives sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to MSP engineers and corporate executives to establish initial access.",
      "evidence_locator": "S.D.N.Y. Indictment 1:18-cr-00891, Count One",
      "mapping_status": "reviewed",
      "mapped_by": "rule",
      "source_title": "DOJ Indictment of APT10 Members",
      "source_url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion",
      "technique_name": "Spearphishing Attachment",
      "tactic": "Initial Access"
    },
    {
      "technique_id": "T1078",
      "evidence_excerpt": "After compromising MSP administrative infrastructure, defendants harvested and abused valid MSP domain credentials to authenticate directly into client environments.",
      "evidence_locator": "S.D.N.Y. Indictment 1:18-cr-00891, Overt Acts",
      "mapping_status": "reviewed",
      "mapped_by": "rule",
      "source_title": "DOJ Indictment of APT10 Members",
      "source_url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion",
      "technique_name": "Valid Accounts",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    },
    {
      "technique_id": "T1021.001",
      "evidence_excerpt": "Operatives used Remote Desktop Protocol and legitimate MSP jump hosts to move laterally into victim intellectual property repositories.",
      "evidence_locator": "S.D.N.Y. Indictment 1:18-cr-00891, Technical Means",
      "mapping_status": "reviewed",
      "mapped_by": "rule",
      "source_title": "DOJ Indictment of APT10 Members",
      "source_url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion",
      "technique_name": "Remote Desktop Protocol",
      "tactic": "Lateral Movement"
    },
    {
      "technique_id": "T1560.001",
      "evidence_excerpt": "Stolen files were staged inside victim networks in encrypted RAR archives prior to covert exfiltration.",
      "evidence_locator": "S.D.N.Y. Indictment 1:18-cr-00891, Overt Acts",
      "mapping_status": "reviewed",
      "mapped_by": "rule",
      "source_title": "DOJ Indictment of APT10 Members",
      "source_url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion",
      "technique_name": "Archive via Utility",
      "tactic": "Collection"
    }
  ],
  "events": [
    {
      "event_type": "incident",
      "event_date": "2016-06-01",
      "description": "APT10 compromises major global MSPs to access client networks under Operation Cloud Hopper."
    },
    {
      "event_type": "indictment",
      "event_date": "2018-12-20",
      "description": "S.D.N.Y. unseals indictment charging Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong with computer intrusion and wire fraud conspiracy."
    }
  ],
  "attack_anatomy": {
    "ground_zero": "Managed Service Provider (MSP) engineering workstations and administrative jump hosts targeted by spearphishing under Operation Cloud Hopper.",
    "blast_radius": "Global compromise of major MSPs enabling lateral access into more than 45 U.S. technology and defense firms, NASA JPL, and U.S. Navy personnel systems across 12 countries.",
    "kill_chain": [
      {
        "phase": "Initial Compromise",
        "title": "Spearphishing MSP Personnel",
        "description": "APT10 sent weaponized emails to MSP administrators to install custom backdoors inside service-provider management networks.",
        "technical_artifacts": [
          "Spearphishing attachments",
          "PlugX / RedLeaves implants"
        ],
        "mitre_technique_id": "T1566.001"
      },
      {
        "phase": "Supply-Chain Pivot",
        "title": "Abuse of Valid MSP Administrative Credentials",
        "description": "Harvested domain and remote-support credentials from MSP vaults to authenticate directly into downstream client networks via RDP.",
        "technical_artifacts": [
          "MSP RMM & RDP logs",
          "Compromised service accounts"
        ],
        "mitre_technique_id": "T1078"
      },
      {
        "phase": "Collection & Exfiltration",
        "title": "Encrypted Archive Staging",
        "description": "Stolen intellectual property and defense schematics were compressed into encrypted RAR archives inside victim environments prior to exfiltration.",
        "technical_artifacts": [
          "Encrypted RAR staging archives",
          "Outbound C2 transfers"
        ],
        "mitre_technique_id": "T1560.001"
      }
    ],
    "defensive_takeaways": [
      "Enforce dedicated, hardware-token MFA and privileged access workstations for all third-party MSP remote connections.",
      "Restrict MSP administrative accounts to least-privilege, time-bound just-in-time sessions.",
      "Audit cross-tenant RMM and RDP authentication logs for anomalous off-hours access."
    ]
  }
}